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BOOK REVIEWS
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
MASS MEDIA. By Jerome A. Barron, Bloomington, Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1973. Pp. 368. $8.95.
There's been a new legal right lurking about since 1967, when
it was first espoused in the Harvard Law Review., This is the right
of access to the media, a new view of the first amendment postulated
by Jerome A. Barron, Dean of the University of Syracuse Law
School, who taught constitutional law and wills, estates and trust at
the University of North Dakota Law School in the early 1960's.
Since its first public airing in 1967, Dean Barron's right of access
has germinated a considerable amount of discussion and thought in
various forums, ranging from -Mass Communication Law, a textbook
co-authored by Dean Barronn and Dr. Donald Gillmor 2; to his address
to a convention of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); to his
address at the annual Law and Free Society lecture series at the
University of Texas Law School; to various book reviews and articles
in The Sturday Review, The George Washington University Law
Review, The Quill, The Columbia Journalism Review, Editor &
Publisher, Trial, and other journals; to a show with James Reston
and Clifton Daniels of the New York Times and Richard Jencks of
CBS over the National Educational Television Network; and finally,
to this book, which is the most exhaustive and up-to-date presenta-
tion yet of Dean Barron's thesis.
What is his thesis? Well, it's based upon the first amendment:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. 8
Dean Barron fashions out of this what he terms a positive inter-
1. Barron, Access to the Press-A N ew First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641
(1967).
2. GmIsoa AND BARON, MAss CoMmuNICcTIONs LAW (1st ed., 1969; Supp. 1971). Dr.
Gillmore, Incidentally, is also a former University of North Dakota instructor. He taught
Journalism and directed the Honors Program n the late 1950s and early 1960s. He is now
teaching Journalism at the University of Minnesota.
8. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
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pretation, i.e. a right of access for all individuals to media coverage.
As he says in his preface, "I became increasingly dissatisfied with
the failure of our law to provide any right of public access for
ideas. [I]n the era of mass communications, the words of the
solitary speaker or the lonely writer, however brave or imaginative,
have little impact unless they are broadcast through the great
engines of public opinion - radio, television and the press. The
major obstacle to freedom of expression in America is the difficulty
of penetrating the media in a serious rather than a bizarre way."4
The book is a complete and thorough exposition of Dean Bar-
ron's thesis. He cites some irresponsible access denials by the media
in turning down ads or refusing commercial air time. He points
out that courts have recognized a right of access to the campus
and high school press, but admits that this is due primarily to the
state involvement in campus papers. "The serious and ludicrous
results of this distinction can be appreciated when it is realized that
what a labor union was unable to gain from four Chicago news-
papers - recognition of a duty to publish - was in fact obtained
by a small group of school children from a high school newspaper." 5
He calls letters-to-the-editor columns a natural field for the
development of a legal right of access. "The contract theory of
right of access has a certain attraction," 6 says Dean Barron,
when discussing letters to the editor. This would bring into play the
remedy of specific performance, but also the problems of offer
and acceptance. Dean Barron says a first amendment based right
to have a letter to the editor published has not yet been given full
dress consideration in court, and he seems to prefer this constitution-
al approach rather than a contractual one.
A great portion of the book looks at radio and television, and
the various court cases and Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) regulations which have, according to Dean Barron, been
slowly forging out an access doctrine of sorts. He discusses the
fairness doctrine, equal time requirements, rights of reply, and the
landmark Red Lion 7 case. However, he doesn't put much faith in
the FCC as a forger of a right of access, saying the FCC "has met
the demands for access to broadcasting obliquely rather than
directly. The FCC steadfastly has refused to open up the media
to the public or to representative public groups as a right." 8 Dean
Barron does acknowledge that, "to everyone's surprise," the FCC in
4. 3. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS. MEDIA
xili (1973).
5. Id. at 36.
6. Id. at 47.
7. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n; United States v.
Radio Television News Directors Ass'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
8. J. BARON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF AccEss TO MASS MEDIA
188 (1973).
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May, 1970 adopted a prime time access rule which does limit the
networks control over prime time programming.
The author goes on to talk about citizen group challenges to
broadcast licenses, CATV and its role in the access spectrum, and
finally the future of access, which he sees as fiarly bright if the
courts use imaginative decision making.
The theory of a right of access has been debated, analyzed and
reviewed for seven years now, and it would take more than a book
review to try any thorough analysis or critique of the access theory.
However, there are a few points which should be parried in
Dean Barron's arguments. Basically, I believe he's building his case
against a problem which really doesn't exist on as widespread a
basis as he pictures. He acknowledges this argument, saying that
"one of the most perplexing obstacles to the right of access is the
media insistence that there is no access problem, or, alternatively,
if there is one it is the critic's responsibility to document it." I
don't know why the documentation requirement is perplexing to
Dean Barron. Any attorney, when he files a change or takes a case
into court, is expected to fully document alleged offenses or wrongs.
Dean Barron can point to a few glaring abuses, but when he
starts talking about problems across the entire country, his docu-
mentation comes up short. The need for better documentation is
shown in one of Dean Barron's statements that "efforts of dissenting
groups on both the left and the right to secure something as funda-
mental and simple as advertising space in their community news-
papers are often futile." 10 The plain fact is they are not often
futile, and Dean Barron shows no evidence that they are.
It is hard to agree, from personal experience with publishers
and reporters, with the broad, general statement by Barron that
"conventional free press theory is a barrier to the admission of
ideas to the media. (The media owners and managers) read freedom
of the press as an immunity from accountability and any kind of
legal responsibility."11 For some reason, Dean Barron throughout
the books shows an almost Nixon-like suspicion of the press, preferring
always to think they will do their worst rather than their best. I
would prefer a more positive notion that most publisher, reporters,
and media owners, like most politicians, and even most law school
deans, are honorable and honest, and are attempting to carry out
their duties to the best of their abilities.
Two remedies are needed, says Barron: a nondiscriminatory
right to purchase editorial advertisements in daily newspapers and
9. Id. at 312.
10. Id. at xiv.
11. rd. at 4-5.
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a right of reply for public figures and public officers defamed in
newspapers.; 2 These are needed, but they shouldn't be imposed by
statute.
One or two instances a whole case do not make. Yet, Dean
Barron details an admittedly bad scene in Chicago - all four papers
turning down ads from a union picketing Marshall Field & Co. -
and then says this shows that "the advertising directors of American
newspapers thus exercise a powerful private censorship."' ' s First of
all, nothing in Chicago is really very typical of America. And, that
kind of sweeping generalization is the kind then-Professor
Barron used to shoot down regularly in his UND constitutional law
teaching days.
Dean Barron seems to think the normal editing functions of a
newspaper or a radio or television station are in fact censorship.
"Freedom to publish, not freedom to censor, is guaranteed by the
first amendment,' 41 4 he says. He quotes Justice Louis Brandeis to
the effect that freedom of the press exists to aid in the discovery
and aid of political truth. "Freedom of the press," says Dean Barron,
"is guaranteed in order that the poeple may have sufficient informa-
tion to participate intelligently as self-governing members in a
democratic order.'1
5
This sounds well and good. Dean Barron adds that an informed
public opinion is not possible unless the public, through newspapers
and the electronic media, are exposed to all shades of opinion.
Again, well and good. But, to Dean Barron, this means every single
idea and theory that comes down the pike.
Now, if there's anything in this era of shortages that's of abund-
ance, or overabundance in America, its different ideas. And some-
how, according to Dean Barron, they must all be able to have
their day in the press and on radio and television.
The public needs to be exposed to different ideas to be an in-
formed part of democracy, but I've never read where every single
idea deserves equal time. This is a practical impossibility.
It sounds as if Dean Barron expects newspapers and radio and
television to perform the same functions as traditionally fulfilled
by the small magazines, the underground press, and scholarly
journals such as law reviews.
Using the Newspaper Preservation Act as an example of state
action to aid newspapers, Dean Barron argues that if you can
legislate to aid the papers, you can also legislate to benefit the
readership. But, would the readers really want all of this in their
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id. at 16.
15. Id. at 15.
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newspapers and radio and television? They can get it now, if they
want, by purchasing the underground papers, and the scholarly
journals where these ideas are now available.
Dean Barron talks about the importance of these ideas gaining
an audience, and dismisses the claims of media executives that the
first amendment does not guarantee all ideas the largest possible
audience, and particularly their audience. He points to court cases
which have given persons rights to distribute leaflets at shopping
centers and similar areas as leading logically to the notion that all
ideas should be granted a similar audience. However, unlike a
shopping center, where people will keep coming back week after
week for groceries, goods, etc., a newspaper reader or a television
watcher is a bit different. If he is exposed to a constant parade
of ideas he doesn't want, he will simply stop reading or watching,
and then the audience is gone.
And, it's questionable if this type of access will lead to the in-
formed and knowledgeable electorate needed for deomocracy.
Letters-to-the-editor columns, says Dean Barron, are much less
open than they appear, and the letters chosen for publication in the
first place are chosen by a highly subjective process and often are
severely edited. But, he never says what this highly subjective process
is. Often, in the case of the larger newspapers, it's simply trying to
get a representative sample of all the letters. For example, the New
York Times in 1969 received 37,719 letters to the editor, and were
able to print only six per cent. It was estimated that if the Times had
printed all 18 million words of these letters to the editor, they would
have filled up at least 135 complete weekday issues. 6
Dean Barron continually ascribes to certain citizen groups great
qualities of representation, seeing them apparently as the will of
the people pitted against the media bosses. He says, for instance,
that the movement for access is designed only to anchor greater
media responsiveness to community desires for direct participation.
He extolls the citizen groups challenging broadcast licenses (such
challenges are sometimes merely a form of sophisticated blackmail)
when in fact they may be representative of only a small minority
within the community and challenging for very selfish reasons. He
talks of the primacy of the audience and the rights of the listeners.
But do these listeners and readers want what Dean Barron wants
to give them? If they did, they could get it now.
Dean Barron also points to the federal judiciary as the ideal
place to decide sticky matters of access, saying they have the wis-
dom and experience of dealing with first amendment problems and
16. Daniel, RiDt of Access to Mass Media--Government ObNigation to Enforce the First
Amendment, 48 TEx. L. REv. 785 (1970).
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protecting first amendment freedoms. I would not be so quick to
ascribe such qualities to the federal judiciary in matters of press
freedom.
As cases have shown in the last year, the judiciary sometimes
takes a fairly repressive look at the media. In fact, a person could
get the feeling, after associating with many attorneys and judges,
and after reading how often the judiciary attempts to gag or exclude
the press, that many attorneys and judges simply do not understand
the media and really rather dislike it.
In his Law and the Free Society lecture, Dean Barron was
challenged by Mr. Clifton Daniel of the New York Times "to write
an access statute that would not entail some measure of official
control of the press."17 Dean Barron, never one to shrink from a
challenge, responded with a bill which was introduced in Congress
in 1970 and which, as he says, was somewhat sardonically called
the Truth Preservation Act. 18 The bill failed to get anywhere, and
17. Id. at 783.
18. The bill H.R. 18941, reads as follows:
To Impose on newspapers of general circulation an obligation to afford cer-
tain members of the public an opportunity to publish editorial advertisements and
to reply to editorial comment.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, that this Act may be cited as the
"'Truth Preservation Act."
Obligation to Provide Access
Sec. 1. Each newspaper of general circulation shall-
(1) publish, in accordance with section 2, all editorial advertisements
submitted to such newspaper, and
(2) provide, in accordance with section 3, a right of reply to any or-
ganization or individual that is the subject of a comment of an edi-
torial nature by such newspaper,
Requirements Respecting Editorial Advertising
Sec. 2. (a) A newspaper of general circulation in a community shall be required
to publish an editorial advertisement-
(1) only after all newspapers of general circulation in such community
have been requested to publish such advertisements and have refused to
publish it, and
(2) provide, in accordance with section 8, a right of reply to any or-
ficient to pay such advertisement (subject to subsection (b)), and the
newspaper has the space necessary to carry the advertisement.
(b) No newspaper of general circulation may charge for
publication of any editorial advertisement, any charge-
(1) in excess of its charges for publication of comparable advertise-
ments which are not editorial advertisements, or
(2) in excess of its charges for publication of other comparable edi-
torial advertisements.
Requirements Respecting Right to Reply
Sec. 3. A newspaper of general circulation which is required under section 1(2)
to provide a right of reply shall afford the individual (or in the case of a com-
ment on an organization, the chief officer or a person delegated by him) a reas-
onable amount of space in a comparable place in the newspaper as soon as prac-
ticable after the newspaper's receipt of the reply.
Sec. 4. Any person aggrieved by the failure of a newspaper of general circula-
tion to comply with any requirement of this Act may obtain a mandatory in-
junction requiring such newspaper to comply with such requirement. The district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of any action brought under
this section.
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Dean Barron admits it probably will not be passed in the near
future. Which is a good thing, because it would open up the doors
to the federal judiciary deciding what should and should not be
printed, to deciding what is a comment of an editorial nature
(which would be an extremely hard decision), and to generally inter-
fering with the media. This is precisely what the first amendment,
I believe, was meant to prevent: government officials telling the
media what it must print.
Both Mr. Daniel, in his rejoinder to Dean Barron in the Law
and the Free Society lecture, and Mr. Ben H. Bagdikian, a noted
press critic, in the Columbia Journalism Review, 9 answered Dean
Barron's criticisms with what the media is doing and can do, short
of Dean Barron's proposals, to remedy abuses in the access area.
Mr. Daniel pointed out that there are more media voices now
than ever before, and that the number of special publications is in-
creasing rapidly. New ideas are not being stifled he said, and in
fact just the opposite, since never before have so many diverse
voices and opinions been heard across the land. He noted that a
right of reply is widely accepted in journalism now, but cautioned
against creating an absolute right of reply to large, ill-defined, hyper-
sensitive population groups.
Mr. Daniel said, "There are effective devices that newspapers
and their readers could and do employ: a page of dissenting opin-
ions; more letters to the editor; no restrictions on political advertis-
ing; an ombudsman for the readers; a column to deal with readers'
complaints and queries; a press council of community representa-
tives to meet regularly with the editors; hiring reporters from min-
ority groups to bring the views of their communities into the news-
room; and establishing a grievance committee to receive complaints
about the press. ' 20
Mr. Daniel, then an associated editor of the Times and now head
of its Washington bureau, also said, about the right to an audience,
that "No artist has a right to a clientele. He has to earn his
audience by the forcefulness of his art, the persuasiveness of his
talent. How much more cogently does this apply to political ideas! ",21
Sec. 5. For the purposes of this Act:
Enforcement
(1) The term "newspaper of general circulation" means a newspaper
Intended to be read by the general public of any geographic area.
(2) The term "editorial advertisement" means an advertisement which
communicates information or expresses opinion on an issue of public
importance or which seeks financial support for an individual or or-
ganization to enable such individual or organization to advocate or car-
ry out a course of action respecting such an issue.
19. Bagdikkian. Right of Access: A Modest ProposaZ, COLUM. J. REv. (Spring 1969).
20. Daniel, Right of Access to Mass Media-Government Obligation to Enforce the First
Amendment, 48 TEX L. Rv. 783, 788 (1970).
21. Id. at 786. The right to an audience idea can be extended to absurdity. There are, for
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Bagdikian suggests: (1) newspapers including an occasional full
page to a skilled journalist writing clearly and fairly on six or
seven ideas of the most thoughtful experts on solutions to specific
public problems; (2) newspapers devoting a full page a day to
letters to the editor, some days for random letters and other days
to a particular issue; (3) appoint a full-time ombudsman on the
newspaper or station to track down and answer questions about the
organization's judgement and performance; and (4) organize a local
press council. Dean Barron dismisses Bagdikian's suggestions as
useful but toothless.
22
Dean Barron's book, in sum, is a rational and thought-provoking
presentation of a difficult constitutional issue which should be read
and discussed by individuals in the media as well as by those
schooled and learned in law.
JACK MCDONALD*
example, many ideas or theories on the law. Some are legitimate and other crackpot. The
audience for these ideas is in the law schools of the country-law students. Would Dean
Barrow allow any and all to lecture to the freshman criminal law class at Syracuse, for
example, on their pet theories of criminal law? I think not, but he would force these same
ideas upon the readers of the New York Times or the Grand Forks Herald, or upon the
viewers of NBC-TV in New York City or WDAZ-TV in Grand Forks.
22. J. BARRON, FRE=OM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF AccEss TO MASS MEDIA
306 (1978).
* B.A., University of North Dakota; Fellow, Washington (D.C.) Journalism Center;
M.A., The American University; J.D., University of North Dakota; past work with United
Press International, the Associated Press, and various newspapers and magazines; Connsel,
North Dakota Legislative Council, 1970-1978; presently assistant city attorney, Grand-Forks.
BOOK REVIEW
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW. By Lawrence M. Friedman,
Simon and Schuster, Rockefeller Center, New York, New York.
655 Pages, $14.95, 1973.
The author's concept of legal history is perhaps best illustrated
by the following quote:
The law is a mirror held up against life. It is order;
it is justice; it is also fear, insecurity and emptyness; it is
whatever results from the scheming, plotting, and striving
of people and groups, with and against each other. All these
things law will continue to be. A full history of American
law would be nothing more or less than a full history of
American life.,
With the above statement, Professor Friedman concludes what is
perhaps one of the more comprehensive histories of the American
legal experience. He begins his book at the beginning-that is, in
the colonial past. Following social, political and economic develop-
ments through the 17th and 18th centuries, his review of the law
becomes not a raw and indigestible collection of case studies, but
rather, a testimony of historical experience.
The author discusses the areas of property, trade, crime, tort,
courts, administrative law, corporations, commerce, labor, tax and
legal literature, among others. The book, because of the extensive
treatment of these topics, lends itself to a most cursory examination.
The purpose of this review is to examine those areas which serve
best to demonstrate the book's content, quality, and the author's
view of the American legal experience.
To begin, the author dismisses several commonly held theories
of early American law.
The colonies did not, as is often thought, adopt in toto the
English system, nor were all the systems similar by reason of
common background. Individual colonies adopted only such English
common law as was needed. The several systems were shaped
not only by the familiar common law, but also by geographical
isolation, the character of the settlements, the absence of external
control, politics and, of course, religion. Massachusetts, for example,
attached legal significance to the Bible.
Civil procedure in the colonies was not strict, but rather began
quite informally. According to the author, this was due chiefly
to the background of the colonists themselves. Not being learned,
they had no need or desire for unnecessary form. Correspondingly,
there were few law-trained judges or lawyers. This early informality
was not to last, for by the 18th century, America had become
1. L. FRmmAN, A HISTORY Op AMERICAN LAW 595 (1973).
16t'
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increasingly influenced by merchants and landowners who demanded
more efficient and uniform laws.
American law was not beholden exclusively to the English com-
mon law for its legal morphology. While the eastern shores were
steeped in English tradition, there also existed a civil law enclave.
French and Spanish culture guided settlements in New Orleans,
Florida, Texas, California, and along the Mississippi. Civil law
traditions influenced many American doctrines and institutions, par-
ticularly in Louisiana, Texas and California.
In 1836, Texas formally adopted common law but not without
some civil law guidance. The Texas Constitution of that date stated:
Congress shall as early as practicable introduce, by
statute, the common law of England, with such modifications
as our circumstances, in their judgment, may require.2
Well into the 19th century, Texas judges were dismissing common
law pleadings as "bold, crafty and unscrupulous."
Ultimately, Louisiana held on as the only solid domain of civil
law, despite early 19th century conflicts with proponents of common
law.
With the American Revolution, a philosophical problem developed
within the legal system. Independence required a whole new attitude
towards common law - after all it was the King's law in the
eyes of the former colonists. Alternatives were suggested: either
total replacement or complete abandonment of all systems in favor
of natural law principles. The Napoleonic Code was suggested by
liberals. In 1805, Thomas Paine commented that the Pennsylvania
courts still "hobble along by the stilts and crutches of English
and antiquated precedents. '" Despite revolutionary fervor and lib-
eralism, the only system that had a chance was that which already
existed. The obvious reasons for this, says Professor Friedman,
were that few jurists spoke anything other than English; French
law books were unavailable whereas English books were plentiful.
Lawyers, too, tended to continue with the law with which they
were familiar.
As Americans began to push westward in the 19th century,
a law for the masses had to develop. The earliest law promulgated
for the western lands was the Ordinance of 1787. It was to become
the foundation law for Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin,
Alabama and Mississippi. Over years of application, it proved work-
able. Although the ordinance helped, it did not immediately render
the west a law-abiding frontier; indeed it was raw and unsophisti-
2. Id. at 150.
3. Id. at 94.
162-
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cated. A portrayal of frontier justice was depicted in a 1854 publi-
cation by Governor Ford of Illinois as follows:
The judges . .. held their courts in log-houses, or in the
barrooms of taverns . . .The sheriff opened court by going
out into the courtyard and saying to the people: "Boys, come
in, our John is going to hold court.
' 4
Interestingly, Professor Friedman compares the laxity observed by
Governor Ford with that found in contemporary traffic courts.
At common law, land was the foundation for economic wealth
and power. As the colonies developed, the public attitude toward
property changed. Almost imperceptively at first, land was convert-
ed from a birthright to a commodity in a free market. The elaborate
forms of English conveyancing were unworkable and unneeded.
Feoffment with livery of seizin gave way to simple deeds. The war-
ranty deed and the quit claim rapidly came into widespread use
because their concepts were understandable to a population that
was largely uneducated. Although usage and tradition dictated the
growth of land law, it was also affected by state legislatures. Illus-
trative of state influence is the development of mortgages. Mort-
gages, long in use for securing land, moved in and out of favor
depending on economic and political attitudes. Western legislatures,
eager to give the debtors relief, were quick to expand the grace
period. Even New York, in 1774, passed a law establishing equitable
foreclosure and in 1820, gave debtors a year of grace.
The westward expansion brought with it vast national acquisition
of land. The federal policy on how this land was to be managed
is basic to American legal development. The land policy of the
United States germinated from one premise: the government did
not wish to manage its land as a capital asset, but rather, place
its ownership and management in the hands of the citizenry. This
attitude had been common to most Americans since the Revolution.
The country was to be composed of a free people, each able
to live on their own land.
From the beginning, it was federal policy to make land available
for sale. A fluctuating price existed between 1800 and 1820, until
the government, in the latter year, pegged the minimum price
at $1.25 per acre. In 1841, persons who agreed to work the land
were guaranteed the right to buy at the minimum price. Perhaps
the greatest encouragement towards westward development was
the Homestead Act passed in 1862. This statute permitted the private
4. T. FoRD, A HISTORY OF ILLINOIS FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT As A STATE IN 1818 TO
1847, at 82-83 (1954).
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individual to receive land grants similar to those which railroads
had received since 1850.
The national policy was successful, for by the end of the 19th
century, the once vast public domain had almost all been either
given away or sold. A fear of complete erosion caused the first
public park to be established in 1872 - Yellowstone National Park.
As alluded to earlier, uniformity in the American legal system
was encouraged by colonial merchants. The author explores the
development of commerce in the Americas by first pointing out
that, in their infancy, American colonies were dependent on inter-
national trade for survival. Requiring a common denominator for
would trade, the colonies adopted the "law merchant." Later com-
mercial law, as it developed in America, was formed from the
roots of that English legal structure.
The law governing the sales of goods was also almost wholly
assimilated from English precedents. The law of sales emerged
from an amalgamation of the "law merchant" with the old law of
contract. The ability to contract was, in the 19th century, regarded
as an important right of a free people. The foundation of contract
law was a belief in unrestricted individual choice in a free market.
The standard contract maxim of caveat emptor was widely employed,
although the rule was not universally admired. One South Carolina
judge in 1818, termed the doctrine a "disgrace to the law."
American commercial law spawned other developments. In 1859,
a New York case announced the concept of third party beneficiary.6
Damages for breach also began to be awarded during this period.
The law of negotiable instruments has been a system of free
and clear transactions from the colonial period to the present.
The colonists, short on money but heavily dependent on trade,
required liberal assignment and simply negotiated notes. The 1840's
saw the introduction of the certified check, and the bill of lading
came along in the 1850's.
Through these years, the law of commercial paper fluctuated
from state to state. Some states had a few regulations; California,
however, had a complete code consisting of 117 sections. Just as
in colonial days, so too in the mid-19th century, businessmen wanted
a more uniform system. Their demands gave rise to the first
uniform law in the United States-The Negotiable Instruments
Law of 1895. Today, the desires of business and trade have been
realized with the Uniform Commercial Code.
No history of American law could be complete without an
examination of crime and criminal law. Professor Friedman sets
5. Barnard v. Yates, 1 Nott & M'cord 142 (S. Car. 1818).
6. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
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out a clear account of this topic. Although criminal laws in the
colonial period sometimes appeared bloodthirsty, there were far
fewer capital crimes than existed in England. Although public display
and rebuke were frequently employed, the death penalty was not.
Colonial criminal law concerned itself primarily with shame and
secondarily with reform. Immorality was the most common crime.
The Revolution brought a change in attitudes toward criminal
law. The Bill of Rights gave rise to an intellectual reassessment
of criminal penalties. The fledgling states were quick to make
reform operative through constitutions and legislation. In 1800, Ken-
tucky allowed the death penalty only in cases of murder. In 1845,
Michigan totally abolished it, followed by Maine in 1887. With the
demise of capital punishment, corporal punishment also declined.
The states were quick to avoid a common law of crimes for
fear it would breed strong federal criminal codes. It was reasoned
that if federal prosecutors argued to federal judges, who in turn
defined the crime and meted punishment, the central government
would become too powerful. Digressing for a moment, it is interest-
ing to wonder what the reaction a century ago would have been to
the federal laws as set out in the United States Code and the Code
of Federal Regulations. Federal power? Definitely.
Because of their fear, the states began to enact great codes
themselves. In 1822, Rhode Island identified only fifty crimes, but
by 1872, the number had grown to one hundred twenty-eight. Few
crimes were ever repealed, but new ones were added year after
year. These codes regulated nearly everything from morality to
embezzlement. Indiana, in 1891, enacted a law making it a crime
to "wilfully wear the badges or buttonnaire of the Grand Army of
the Republic." 7 It is not recorded whether anyone was ever charged
under this statute.
With the 19th century came new theories on the nature of
the criminal mind. In 1843, an English court promulgated the
M'Naghten rule of legal insanity.8 This rule was further elaborated
upon by the "irresistible impulse" test, usually referred to as the
Dillon rule. New Hampshire developed its own theory in 1869 through
the case of State v. Pike.9
Extensive development in the field of tort law grew in the
mid-1800's. The industrialization of the country witnessed many in-
juries caused by machines and railroads. At first, American tort
law borrowed its theories from England: Priestly v. Fowler ° sup-
7. Laws Ind. 1891, ch. 38.
8. M'Naghten's Case, 10 C1. & F. 200 (1843).
9. 49 N.H. 899, 442 (1869).
10. 3 X & W 1 (1887).
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plied the fellow-servant rule, and Rylands v. Fletcher provided the
rationale for extrahazardous activity liability."' The doctrine of
contributory negligence, also spawned in England, came to American
law in the mid-19th century.
Assumption of the risk developed alongside the fellow-servant
rule, and together these doctrines protected the entrepreneur from
the growing list of injury claims.
To balance out the ammunition available to either side in injury
suits, American tort law imported the doctrine of last clear chance
and res ipsa loquitur. Both of these were the product of an English
case.
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Although case law taken from England provided the framework,
tort law really grew with state legislation. Across the country, the
states were drafting statutes defining the liabilities of railroads
and other enterprises. While tort law began as a benefit to the
young industrial corporations, it closed the 19th century as a com-
pensation oriented field.
As the body of American law developed, so did the mechanics
of the law - otherwise called lawyers. Early colonists were suspi-
cious of lawyers, and seldom saw any reason ro rely on them.
Massachusetts specifically prohibited pleading for hire, as did Vir-
ginia, Connecticut, and the Carolinas. This distrust was generated
by a feeling that lawyers were members of the upper classes
and favored the causes of their peers. The colonists, being them-
selves untrained for the most part, felt law trained persons were
unnecessary in any position. Even the courts were run by lay judges.
Again the merchants spurred the development of a trained
legal profession. Courts continued to sit, trade expanded, and land
was exchanged. These areas required someone learned in law.
Despite the absence of law schools, lawyers were generally available
by 1750 in most cities. Apprenticeship training provided the bar
with its members. Though not always good, this method did generate
some fine lawyers. Out of the law office apprenticeship method
grew the first law schools. The first was founded in Litchfield,
Connecticut in 1784. Harvard established a chair of law in 1816,
and had 163 students by 1844.
If lawyers were unloved in the colonial period, they were even
more disliked during the Revolution. Public opinion still regarded
lawyers as persons who lived "upon the ruins of the distressed."' s
American lawyers tended to be persons from humble beginnings
with meager education. Although not scholarly, they were ambitious.
11. (1868) L.IL 3 H.L. 830.
12. Davies v. Mann, 10 M & W 546 (1842).
13. Quoted In OSCAR HANDLIN AND MARY HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A, STUDY OF THE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERCAN ECONOMY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861, at 43 (1969).
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Over the years they prospered because they were dynamic. The
author says the practice of law is best described as what lawyers
do. Lawyers became a prime cog in the development of American
law. They were everywhere and involved in everything. Some began
large city practices. Other attorneys, rough-hewn to be sure, joined
the westward migration, serving often as agents for eastern specula-
tors or as collection agents. Whatever the reason, they prospered.
They had a large hand in drafting the legal system of the new
western states. J. Warner Mills left his imprint on the Colorado
statutes, as did Matthew Deady on the Oregon code. Lawyers came
to fill most of the governmental offices in both federal and state
governments. Many presidents and most senators have been lawyers.
It was in their nature to be political. The Watergate scandal of
this year more than amply illustrates this fact in a most unfortunate
way.
In summary, Professor Friedman, a specialist in English and
American legal history, has written an immensely readable book.
As the author of several other books and over thirty articles,
he has, by his current work, demonstrated a capacity for clear
historical analysis. The Stanford University School of Law is indeed
fortunate to have him on their faculty.
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